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Commentary/Stoffregen & Bardy: On specification and the senses
opsis functioning “in a unitary manner” are not surprising, but
they are unlikely to be treated as evidence against separation of
the senses. In the context of neurophysiology, concern should be
given to receptor systems and their cortical projections rather than
higher cortical functions which integrate signals from the sensory
projection areas. The arguments for unitary perception are more
forceful than those for a unitary sense.
Most detailed examples of perception given in support of S&B’s
approach understandably derive from their own research, although they are from a narrow range of visual-vestibular interactions. Moreover, many are artificial in a real sense since they
mostly involve vehicular motion. Any theory that is based on the
global array and its use should restrict the phenomena to those
that occur in the natural environment rather than incorporate dimensions that are unique to one species. Since an evolutionary
perspective is implied by the authors, they should confine their
analyses of perception and action to those which do not incorporate artificial devices.
The vestibular system provides a telling example of the manner
in which our understanding of perception has been advanced
by the specification of sense. It was the first increment in two millennia to Aristotle’s five senses. The anatomy of the vestibular
labyrinth was described long before its function was appreciated;
between these two events the visual consequences of vestibular
stimulation were subjected to observation and experiment (see
Wade 2000). Rotating the body to induce vertigo resulted in postrotary nystagmus and apparent visual motion, the directions of
which were dependent upon head orientation during rotation.
These responses to body rotation could be interpreted when the
hydrodynamic theory of semicircular canal function was advanced
in the 1870s. Would such understanding have been achieved without the specification of a separate vestibular sense? It is the case
that Stoffregen and Riccio (1988) have denied the link between
vestibular stimulation and perceived orientation, but there are
those inclined to dispute their claims (see Curthoys & Wade 1990).

Infants, too, are global perceivers
Arlene Walker-Andrews
Department of Psychology, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903.
arlenewa@rci.rutgers.edu
www.rci.rutgers.edu/~arlenewa

Abstract: Infants are global perceivers. They detect patterns in stimulation that allow detection of many affordances of the environment. Pick-up
of structural patterns across forms of ambient energy awaits maturation of
sensory systems and improvements in motor skill, but development proceeds rapidly during the first year. Researchers in perceptual development
must devise and refine existing tools to examine infants’ abilities.

When I first examined infants’ emotion perception using an intermodal task (Walker 1982), I was asked why I compared an infant’s looking time to a happy facial expression projected alongside
a sad facial expression and accompanied by a happy vocal expression to that shown in the opposite setup. That is, the comparison
was with the infant’s looking time to the happy expression when it
was projected alongside the sad expression, but accompanied by
a sad vocal expression. The expectation instead had been that I
should use, as baseline, looking at a facial expression when it was
presented as one of a silent pair. I have struggled to answer this
question, never able to furnish an argument that convinced although I was certain of my choice. I have argued that (1) two facial expressions and one soundtrack and (2) two facial expressions
– comprise only two very different events. Stoffregen & Bardy
(S&B) provide the rationale I have been seeking: the whole is not
only greater than but is qualitatively different from the sum of its
parts. The integrated action of seeing and hearing leads to the perception of an “irreducible” product, in the present example an
emotional expression that affords opportunities for action.
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The target article is the paper I almost wish I had written. S&B
present a logical, well-supported argument for specification. They
point out how many of us have been unable to escape the assumption that the senses are separate channels even as we claimed
we were rejecting that accepted wisdom. They clarify for me why
it has been so difficult to maintain precision with such terms as
“intermodal,” “crossmodal,” “amodal,” and “multimodal.” I have
tried, for example, to reserve “crossmodal” for situations in which
an observer viewed something and subsequently heard or felt it, a
situation that may require the kind of inference that most theories
assume.
S&B make additional points that speak to the common fallacy
that infants will be unable to “process” information when they encounter in the lab a stimulus event such as a moving, computergenerated disk punctuated by a beep at the lowest point in its trajectory, flanked by another disk that is not. The usual assumption
is that infants must compare information obtained via vision to
that obtained via audition to determine which icon is consistent
with the sounds, and that this will tax their abilities (Bahrick 1992;
Lewkowicz 1993). Infants at a specific age may indeed fail a specific intermodal task, but not because they cannot deal with simultaneous presentations of separate optic and acoustic arrays.
Sensitivity to a higher-order pattern is required, not internal comparisons of information derived from single-energy arrays.
Two aspects of S&B’s paper could be improved. First, although
they acknowledge that James Gibson (1966) provided the original
example for information in the global array, they do not describe
the scope of his contribution. This may represent misinterpretation, ambiguities in the theory, or evidence for the growth of
Gibson’s own thinking. Congruent with the latter, Gibson (1979)
himself described the theory of information pick-up as in an “undeveloped state.” But he went on to say: “Information is not
specific to the banks of photoreceptors, mechanoreceptors, and
chemoreceptors that lie within the sense organs. Sensations are
specific to receptors and thus, normally, to the kinds of stimulus
energy that touch them off. But information is not energyspecific” (p. 243). He asserted that we directly perceive the qualities of things in the world, especially their affordances. S&B take
up these ideas and propel them much farther along the path Gibson had begun to clear.
Second, S&B little attend to developmental research. Consider
results from Walker-Andrews and Lennon (1985) and Pickens
(1994). In the earlier study, 5-month-olds observed videotapes of
a Volkswagen (VW) moving toward or away from them accompanied by a noise that increased or decreased in amplitude. Infants
looked preferentially at the videotape consistent with the engine
noise – the approaching VW when the noise grew louder, the receding VW when it softened. Note that the rate of change in amplitude was correlated with movements of both vehicles, but infants responded to directional information as well. Pickens (1994)
introduced critical refinements – a condition in which a toy train
changed in size only (rather than moving in depth), another in
which each film’s brightness varied, and one in which the trains
moved up and down. Infants looked appropriately for motion in
depth and, less so, for size changes. They did not show preferences
related to brightness changes or vertical movement. Five-montholds were sensitive to ecological relations specifying approach versus retreat and did not generalize to intensity or metaphorical relations.
Although S&B fail to capitalize on the wealth of infant data, they
simultaneously present a challenge to developmental researchers.
The authors proffer but dismiss the possibility that infants are initially sensitive to structure in single-energy arrays and develop
sensitivity to the global array because this assertion demands the
corollary that there are separate senses. In fact, infants appear to
be sensitive to the global array. They detect some invariant patterns in the first few weeks of life (e.g., Gibson & Walker 1984;
Meltzoff & Borton 1979). Months later they can detect arbitrary
relations such as those contrived between the color and taste of a
substance (Reardon & Bushnell 1988) or a label and a moving ob-
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ject (Gogate & Bahrick 1998). There is continued debate about
the role, if any, of modality-specific information during infancy
(c.f. Bahrick & Lickliter 2000) as well as the acknowledgment that
although all sensory systems are potentially functional prenatally,
they mature at different rates. Taking a lead from the present paper, however, those of us who study infants should consider more
carefully how we present perceptual problems. It may no longer
suffice to construct multimodal displays and test whether infants
appreciate invariant relations. S&B suggest some alternatives, but
designing such studies given infants’ limited behavioral repertoires will be difficult.
In closing, S&B have contributed an important essay in the debate about the nature and origins of perception. They make a convincing case for specification and for an active perceiver, one not
hobbled by the imposition of energy-specific stimulation but free
to sample the global array and detect affordances.

Motion, frames of reference, dead horses,
and metaphysics
A. H. Wertheim
TNO Human Factors, 3769-ZG, Soesterberg, The Netherlands.
wertheim@tm.tno.ni

Abstract: Various annoyingly incorrect statements of Stoffregen & Bardy
are corrected, for example, that perception researchers commonly use the
term “absolute motion” to denote motion without any frame of reference,
confuse earth-relative and gravity-relative motion, err with respect to the
frame of reference implied by their subject is motion responses, believe in
sense specific motion percepts, and do not investigate sensory interactions
at neurophysiological levels. In addition, much of the target article seems
to concern metaphysics rather than empirical science.

Stoffregen & Bardy (S&B) state that “a common concept . . .
among many researchers, including myself, is . . . the idea of absolute motion” not defined in terms of any frame of reference
(S&B use the term referent). But neither I nor anyone else that I
know has ever embraced such a peculiar idea. The relativity of motion has always been my explicit point of departure (Wertheim
1981) and I have argued that a theory must he flawed if it yields a
concept of motion that is not definable in terms of a frame of reference (see e.g., my discussion of the “hidden reciprocity assumption” in Wertheim 1994, sect. R2). S&B call on researchers
always to mention the particular frame of reference in terms of
which they define motion. But this is what everybody has been doing all along (see e.g., Swanston & Wade 1988, Wertheim 1994,
and many of its accompanying BBS commentaries, also sects. R5
and R6). In the literature (e.g., Kinchla 1971; Wertheim 1994, p.
302) the term “absolute motion” denotes motion defined in terms
of the three-dimensional (3D) frame of reference dimensioned by
the earth’s surface and the direction of gravity. Other names might
have served just as well: for example, “motion relative to absolute
space,” “Newtonian motion,” “exocentric motion,” or “earth-relative motion.” This is perfectly in line with Einstein’s claim that the
idea of frameless motion has no meaning. When S&B defend Einstein’s views vis-à-vis those of perception researchers (see also
Stoffregen 1994), they beat a dead horse.
The same can be said about S&B’s elaborate argument that
there can be motion relative to the earth without it being relative
to the direction of gravity (i.e., when perpendicular to the direction of gravity). To my knowledge nobody has ever equated earthrelative motion with motion relative to the earth’s gravity.
S&B also criticize many researchers, including me, for stating
that the perception of visually induced self-motion is often illusory. What those authors mean is that in the presence of a large
optic flow field, one often experiences a perception of self-motion
relative to the earth’s surface, while, physically speaking, one remains stationary relative to that surface. The most common ex-

ample of this illusion occurs when an earth-stationary observer is
seated inside a rotating optokinetic drum. S&B claim that this is
not an illusion, because the relative motion between the drum and
the observer is correctly perceived. It is, but that is not the illusion
which concerns a different percept, namely, perceiving self-motion relative to the earth’s surface. S&B seem to believe that this
is not really perceived inside the drum, although experimenters
believe it is. They claim that there is no illusion; only a misunderstanding between observer and experimenter as to the frame of
reference relevant to the observer’s percept, a misunderstanding
which should disappear when the frame of reference is explicitly
stated in the perceiver’s verbal report.
However, whether S&B like it or not, earth-relative self-motion
really is experienced by observers inside an optokinetic drum: they
believe that they are moving relative to the floor of the experimental room in which the drum is located (and perceive the drum
as stationary relative to that floor). Since this is not physically the
case, the term illusion is correct.
Contrary to what S&B suggest, researchers in the field of visualvestibular interactions and self-motion (including myself ) are always careful to correctly ascertain the frame of reference in which
subjects report self-motion percepts. They either specifically ask
about it, or use non-verbal methods (e.g., by asking the subjects to
continuously keep a joystick pointed toward where they believe
the door of the experimental room is located). In fact, these researchers were the first to recognize the dangers of verbal ambiguities about frames of reference; terms such as “exocentric” and
“egocentric” originated from their work. S&B’s accusation that researchers “routinely exclude correct responses from their analysis
. . . because of verbal ambiguities in their subjects’ reports,” reveals a shocking lack of knowledge. This is not even kicking a dead
horse, but kicking a nonexistent one.
Another problem is S&B’s claim that my analysis of percepts of
“absolute motion” is sense-specific (see also Stoffregen 1994), that
is, requires only one sensory system. This is incorrect. In my
model (Wertheim 1994) the retinal coordinates of image motion
are recalibrated into the 3D coordinates of the frame of reference
defined by the earth’s surface and gravity. This is brought about
with what I termed “reference signals.” These are compound signals constructed from sensory afferents generated by various sensory systems (somatosensory, vestibular, and visual). In addition,
retinal and reference signals themselves have no perceptual
meaning. It is their interaction which yields percepts of motion.
Consequently, on the perceptual level, one cannot speak of separate senses. This is also implied by other inferential theories,
which use the theoretical forerunners of reference signals (“extraretinal signals,” “corollary discharges,” “efference copy signals”).
Hence, no inferential theorist assumes that motion perception is
sense-specific (see Wertheim 1999, for a more detailed analysis
of this issue). Nor do vestibular researchers – who, for decades
now, are trying to unravel the way how retinal, somatosensory,
and vestibular afferents interact to bring about particular percepts
of self-motion – assume that motion perception (of any kind) is
sensory-specific (see e.g., Sauvan 1999). On the contrary, these
sensory interactions are their core business, both on the perceptual and on the neurophysiological level.
Hence, it is not at all surprising that S&B have been unable to
locate an explicit justification of the assumption of separate senses
in the philosophical, behavioral, or neurophysiological literatures.
Who would want to justify a false assumption? S&B’s call to search
“for neural units that respond to patterns of activity that extend
across different kinds of receptors, such as the retinae and the
vestibule,” again is out of touch with the literature. Here too the
authors beat a dead horse.
Finally, it is difficult to make sense of S&B’s discussion of various possible relations between an energy array and (aspects of) reality – a relation which is “prior to and independent of . . . psychological processes.” The point is that, reality per se is unknown.
This is metaphysics, not empirical science. Reality can only be assumed: we assume that what we perceive is reality. For all practiBEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2001) 24:2
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